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I. INTRODUCTION
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution prohibits the trial of an incompetent
defendant.1 To reinforce this principle, Congress has enacted substantive
and procedural safeguards, requiring the trial of an incompetent
defendant to be delayed while medical treatment is administered.2
Despite Congressional attempts to effectively implement this Fourteenth
Amendment guarantee, a crucial question is currently being debated in
the federal circuits:3 whether the defendant bears the burden of proving
incompetency, or, in the alternative, whether the government must
establish competency.4 In the absence of statutory allocation,5 the
federal circuits must be careful when determining which party bears the
burden of proof since “where the burden of proof lies may be decisive of
the outcome.”6
The recognition that an incompetent defendant should not be tried
dates back to English common-law and was included in William
Blackstone’s seventeenth century commentaries.7 Blackstone wrote that
if an individual, before arraignment of an offense, “becomes mad, he
ought not be arraigned for it; because he is not able to plead to it with
that advice and caution that he ought.”8 Blackstone further argued that if
the individual becomes mad after pleading, “he shall not be tried: for
how can he make his defense?”9 Thus, there are firm historical roots that
advise against trying a defendant who is unable to comprehend and
participate in the proceedings against him.10
1

U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1 states “nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. . . .”; Medina v. California, 505 U.S.
437, 439 (1992) (“It is well established that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits the criminal government of a defendant who is not competent to
stand trial.”).
2
See 18 U.S.C. § 4241 (2006).
3
See infra Part III.
4
See United States v. Patel, 524 F. Supp. 2d 107, 110 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 2007).
5
See infra Part II.A.
6
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958).
7
Bruce J. Winick, Criminal Law: Reforming Incompetency to Stand Trial and Plead
Guilty: A Restated Proposal and a Response to Professor Bonnie, 85 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 571, 574 (1995). Blackstone’s Commentaries have been referred to as “the
most influential legal text in colonial America.” Taunya Lovell Banks, Dangerous
Woman: Elizabeth Key’s Freedom Suit – Subjecthood and Racialized Identity in
Seventeenth Century Colonial Virginia, 41 AKRON L. REV. 799, 832 (2008).
8
2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *24.
9
Id.
10
See Paula Siuta Eichner, Cooper v. Oklahoma and the Fundamental Right Not to
Be Tried While Incompetent, 24 N.E.J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CON. 511, 517 (1998) (“The legal
doctrine against the trial of an incompetent defendant is firmly rooted in English and
American legal history.”).
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The leading United States Supreme Court case reinforcing this
conviction is Drope v. Missouri,11 where, writing for the majority, Chief
Justice Burger made two observations about the trial of an incompetent
defendant. First, Burger reasoned that the trial of an incompetent
defendant is analogous to a trial in absentia.12 Specifically, despite an
individual’s physical presence at the proceedings, the lack of mental
capacity sufficient to defend oneself is equivalent to trying a defendant
utterly absent from the hearing.13 Second, Burger explicitly asserted that
the prohibition against trying an incompetent defendant “is fundamental
to an adversary system of justice.”14 Ultimately, if a term of
imprisonment is imposed upon a mentally incompetent defendant, the
defendant’s inability to effectively understand and reflect upon such
sentence clashes with the underlying objectives of punishment.15
Ensuring the defendant’s competence preserves not only the accuracy but
also the fairness, dignity and honor of the verdict, all of which form the
cornerstone of the American judicial system.16
Part II of this Comment reviews the federal statute that governs
incompetency, 18 U.S.C. § 4241. Despite its efforts to outline the
procedures and substantive standards for determining competency,
Congress has not explicitly allocated the burden of proof to the
government or defendant. Further, the legislative history of the statute
does not clarify which party Congress intended to bear the burden of
proof. Part III explores two Supreme Court cases, Medina v. California17
and Cooper v. Oklahoma,18 which address state competency standards.
At the outset, these cases are not persuasive for the purpose of allocating
the federal standard of proof, because their analyses are respectively
centered upon the California and Oklahoma state competency standards,
not 18 U.S.C. § 4241. In addition to solely addressing state competency
11

420 U.S. 162, 170 (1975).
Id. at 171.
13
Id.; see also Thomas v. Cunningham, 313 F.2d 934, 938 (4th Cir. 1963) (“And yet
one who is mentally deranged may be as far removed from the proceedings as if
physically absent.”).
14
Drope, 420 U.S. at 171–72.
15
See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2006) (delineating factors for the court to consider in
addressing the need for a sentencing, including: “(A) to reflect the seriousness of the
offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from
future crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational
or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective
manner.”).
16
Grant H. Morris, Mental Disorder and the Civil/Criminal Distinction, 41 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 1177, 1181 n.22 (2004).
17
505 U.S. 437 (1992).
18
517 U.S. 348 (1996).
12
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standards, both state statutes create a presumption of competence19—a
characteristic absent from the federal competency statute. Moreover, the
allocation of the burden of proof in those two jurisdictions is settled.20
Part IV reveals each circuit court’s position, if any, on which party bears
the federal burden of proof. Most notably, two circuits, the Fourth and
Eleventh, have without original analysis, adopted the Supreme Court’s
position in Cooper v. Oklahoma. Part V offers a survey of where the
burden of proof lies in state competency hearings. Part VI asserts that the
substantive standards of 18 U.S.C. § 4241 embody concerns about access
to evidence, risk of error, and fundamental fairness. These three factors
collectively and conclusively suggest that a potentially incompetent
defendant should not be called upon to prove his own incompetence.
Consequently, when the issue of competence is raised during a federal
criminal proceeding, the Government must bear the burden of proof of
establishing the defendant’s competence to stand trial. Finally, Part VII
concludes by reinforcing the consistency of the arguments advanced with
Blackstone’s historical observations.
II. MENTAL COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL: REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL
STATUTE AT ISSUE
Congress codified the federal procedures governing a defendant’s
mental competency to stand trial in 18 U.S.C. § 4241. If concern arises
regarding the defendant’s mental competency, the government,
defendant’s counsel, or the court, sua sponte, may request a hearing to
determine the defendant’s mental competency.21 This motion can only
be made after the prosecution commences but prior to sentencing.22 In
evaluating the motion’s basis, the court considers if “there is reasonable
cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from a
mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the
extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the
proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense.”23 If these
requirements are met, the court must grant the motion for a competency
hearing.
At the competency hearing, a similar standard must be satisfied,
with two exceptions: (1) the reasonable cause to believe standard of
proof is replaced with a preponderance of the evidence standard; and (2)
19

See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1369(f) (West 1982); OKLA STAT. tit. 22, § 1175.4(B)
(1991).
20
See OKLA STAT. tit. 22, § 1175.4(B) (1991); Medina, 505 U.S. at 440.
21
Id. § 4241(a).
22
Id.
23
Id. (emphasis added).
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the defendant must be “presently suffering from a mental disease,” not
the possibility of suffering.24 With these changes in mind, the defendant
will be deemed mentally incompetent to stand trial, if, based on a
preponderance of the evidence, the defendant “is unable to understand
the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist
properly in his defense.”25
Subsequent to a finding of incompetence, the Attorney General
takes custody of the defendant and determines a suitable facility to treat
the defendant.26 During a reasonable period of treatment, which may not
initially exceed four months,27 the defendant is evaluated to determine if
sufficient capacity exists for the proceedings to continue.28 Once the
defendant demonstrates the requisite capacity to “understand the nature
and consequences of the proceedings against him and to assist properly
in his defense,” the defendant is discharged from treatment and the trial
is rescheduled on the court’s calendar.29
A. Ambiguities Surrounding 18 U.S.C. § 4241
Although § 4241 provides detailed procedures outlining which
parties can raise a motion for a mental competency hearing, the
substantive standards to grant the hearing, and the substantive standards
to commit the defendant at the conclusion of the hearing, § 4241 and its
sister sections30 are silent as to which party bears the burden of proof
during the hearing. Instead, § 4241 merely states that “[i]f, after the
hearing, the court finds by a preponderance of evidence that the
defendant is presently suffering from a mental disease,”31 then the
proceedings against him will be suspended.
Consequently, because the statutory language fails to indicate
which party bears the burden of proof, a question arises as to “whether
the Government bears the burden of establishing competency [of the
defendant] or the defendant bears the burden of establishing [his]
incompetency” during the hearing.32 Answering this question becomes

24

Compare 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) with 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a).
18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) (2006) (emphasis added).
26
Id.
27
A request for an additional reasonable period of time can be made. 18 U.S.C. §
4241(d)(2).
28
Id. § 4241(d)(1).
29
Id. § 4241(e).
30
Specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 4241(c) states that “the hearing shall be conducted
pursuant to the provisions of section 4247(d) [18 U.S.C. § 4247(d)].”
31
Id. §4241(d) (emphasis added).
32
Patel, 524 F. Supp. 2d at 110.
25
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increasingly difficult due to a dearth of legislative history,33 and the
absence of an on-point United States Supreme Court decision.34 As a
result, the circuit courts have been left to resolve the allocation of proof.
B. The Legislative History of 18 U.S.C. § 4241
In 1984, after fifteen years of hearings and deliberations,35
Congress passed the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984
[hereinafter “CCCA”].36 The CCCA has been deemed “the most radical
change in federal criminal law in the history of our Nation,”37 resulting
from Congressional effort to modernize federal criminal law.38 Most
significantly for the present discussion, the CCCA “completely amended
chapter 313 of title 18 of the United States Code relating to the procedure
to be followed by federal courts with respect to offenders who are
currently suffering from a mental disease or defect.”39 The specific
portion of the CCCA that amended 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241–47 is individually
referred to as the “Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1983” [hereinafter
“IDRA”].40 However, despite the CCCA’s “radical”41 cumulative
changes to federal criminal law, the IDRA competency revisions contain
only slight departures from the pre-amended statutes.42 Instead, the
IDRA primarily focused on federalizing the insanity defense.43
Prior to the IDRA, the statute governing mental incompetency was
18 U.S.C. § 4244.44 Beginning with the differences between preamended § 424445 and the current competency section, § 4241, a
modification was made as to when the motion to determine competency
can first be raised: § 4244 allowed a motion to be raised immediately
after arrest, but § 4241 only permits a motion to be raised after the

33

Id. at 110, n.33.
Id. at 110–11 (“The Supreme Court, however, briefly commented on this issue
[which party bears the burden of proof in a section 4241 mental competency hearing] in
dicta in Cooper v. Oklahoma.”) (emphasis added).
35
KENNETH R. FEINBERG, COMPREHENSIVE CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1984 250
(Practising Law Institute 1985).
36
Id. at 249.
37
Id.
38
United States v. White, 887 F.2d 705, 707 (6th Cir. 1989).
39
United States v. Nichols, 661 F. Supp. 507, 508 n.1 (W.D. Mich. 1987).
40
Id. at 508.
41
See FEINBERG supra note 38, at 249.
42
United States v. Williams, 998 F.2d 258, 265 n.16 (5th Cir. 1993).
43
See infra Part VI.C.
44
See generally 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1949).
45
All subsequent references to 18 U.S.C. § 4244 refer to the pre-amended statute
dealing with competency standards and procedures, not current 18 U.S.C. § 4244, or
“hospitalization of a convicted person.”
34
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commencement of the prosecution.46 Next, although both sections allow
a psychiatric examination before an actual competency hearing, § 4244
required the examination, while § 4241 affords judicial discretion.47
Furthermore, while both sections authorize the court to subsequently
hold a mental competency hearing where the judge is the trier of fact,
only § 4241 codifies the standard of proof—a preponderance of the
evidence standard.48
Focusing on the similarities between §§ 4244 and 4241, both
sections indicate, with slightly different language, that mental
incompetence is the failure of the defendant to comprehend the
proceedings, or an inability of the defendant to properly assist in his
defense.49 Additionally, both §§ 4244 and 4241 permit a motion to
determine mental competency to be raised by the government,50
defendant’s counsel, or the court.51 Most importantly, both statutes fail
to explicitly allocate the burden of proof to a specific party to
demonstrate incompetency or competency during the competency
hearing.52
Focusing on the burden of proof, the Senate Report considering the
IDRA is similarly unsupportive. In fact, the Senate Report merely states
that “Subsection (d) of section 4241 provides that the court must make a
determination with respect to the defendant’s competency based upon a

46
Compare 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1949) (“Whenever after arrest . . .”) with 18 U.S.C. §
4241 (2006) (“At any time after the commencement of a prosecution . . .”).
47
Compare 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1949) (“the court shall. . .”) with 18 U.S.C. § 4241
(2006) (“the court may . . .”).
48
18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) (2006).
49
Compare 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1949) (“so mentally incompetent as to be unable to
understand the proceedings against him or properly assist in his own defense . . . “) with
18 U.S.C. § 4241 (2006) (“rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is
unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to
assist properly in his defense.”).
50
The 11th Circuit concluded that old § 4244 placed more of an emphasis on the
Government raising an issue of defendant’s mental state. United States v. Izquierdo, 448
F.3d 1269, 1277–78 (11th Cir. 2006). Even assuming arguendo that the Government had
a greater obligation to raise an issue of defendant’s mental state, the former § 4244
nevertheless permitted defendant’s counsel and the court to raise an issue of defendant’s
mental state as well. See 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1949).
51
Compare 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1949) (If “the United States attorney has reasonable
cause to believe . . . he shall file a motion . . . . Upon such a motion or upon a similar
motion in behalf of the accused, or upon its own motion, the court . . .”) with 18 U.S.C. §
4241(a) (2006) (“[T]he defendant or the attorney for the Government may file a motion
for a hearing to determine the mental competency of the defendant. The court shall grant
the motion, or shall order such a hearing on its own motion . . .”).
52
Compare 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1949) with 18 U.S.C. § 4241 (2006).
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preponderance of the evidence.”53 Unfortunately, the legislative history
of competency to stand trial fails to shed light on which party Congress
intended to bear the burden of proof.
III. MISPLACED RELIANCE ON THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISIONS IN
MEDINA V. CALIFORNIA AND COOPER V. OKLAHOMA
There is no binding Supreme Court authority on the federal burden
of proof for 18 U.S.C. § 4241.54 Medina v. California55 and Cooper v.
Oklahoma56 are two leading Supreme Court decisions that address the
constitutionality of California and Oklahoma state laws that require the
defendant to prove his incompetency.57 This section will distinguish
both Medina and Cooper, arguing that neither case convincingly
advocates placing the federal burden of proof in competency hearings on
the defendant.
A. Medina v. California
Medina presented the Supreme Court with an opportunity to assess
competency requirements under California state law.58 There, Teofilo
Medina, Jr., armed with a stolen gun, terrorized two gas stations, a food
market, and dairy.59 At the conclusion of his rampage, Medina had
murdered three employees of the respective establishments and was
charged with “three counts of first-degree murder.”60 Concerned with his
client’s mental state, Medina’s attorney moved for a competency hearing
pursuant to California state law.61
California’s controlling statute for a determination of mental
competency reads: “It shall be presumed that the defendant is mentally
competent unless it is proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the
53

United States v. Gigante, 996 F. Supp. 194, 199 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (quoting
INSANITY DEFENSE REFORM ACT OF 1984, S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 236 (1983), reprinted in
1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3418).
54
See supra note 34.
55
505 U.S. 437.
56
517 U.S. 348.
57
Medina, 505 U.S. at 439 (“The issue in this is case is whether the Due Process
Clause permits a State [California] to require a defendant who alleges incompetence to
stand trial to bear the burden of proving so by a preponderance of the evidence.”);
Cooper, 517 U.S. at 350 (“In Oklahoma the defendant in a criminal prosecution is
presumed to be competent to stand trial unless he proves his incompetence by clear and
convincing evidence.”).
58
Medina, 505 U.S. at 439 (“The issue in this case is whether the Due Process
Clause permits a State to require a defendant who alleges incompetence to stand trial to
bear the burden of proving so by a preponderance of the evidence.”).
59
Id.
60
Id. at 439–40.
61
Id.
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defendant is mentally incompetent.”62 California courts have interpreted
this statute to force the “party claiming incompetence [to] bear[] the
burden of proving that defendant is incompetent by a preponderance of
the evidence.”63 Consequently, due to the presumption of competence
and Medina’s claim of incompetence, Medina bore the burden of proof.
Despite Medina’s verbal outbursts and overturning of the counsel table,
the jury determined that Medina did not meet his burden of proof to
establish incompetence, and the trial proceeded.64 Subsequently, Medina
was convicted on all three murder charges and sentenced to the death
penalty.65 After an unsuccessful appeal to the California Supreme Court,
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.66 There, the Court
affirmed the California Supreme Court, rejecting both Medina’s
constitutional arguments against a presumption of incompetency and the
requirement that the defendant must demonstrate his own
incompetence.67
In analyzing Medina’s constitutional claim against a defendant
proving his own incompetence, the Supreme Court borrowed the due
process framework from Patterson v. New York.68 Similar to Medina,
Patterson involved a due process challenge against a New York state law
where the defendant bore the burden of proving an extreme emotional
disturbance affirmative defense.69 In rejecting the petitioner’s claim, the
Patterson Court held:
It goes without saying that preventing and dealing with crime is
much more the business of the States than it is of the Federal
Government . . . and that we should not lightly construe the
Constitution so as to intrude upon the administration of justice by
the individual states. Among other things, it is normally “within
the power of the State to regulate procedures under which its
laws are carried out, including the burden of producing evidence
and the burden of persuasion,” and its decision in this regard is
not subject to proscription under the Due Process Clause unless
“it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”70

62

CAL. PENAL CODE § 1369(f) (West 1982).
Medina, 505 U.S. at 440.
64
Id. at 441.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 442.
67
Id. at 441–42.
68
Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 445 (1992).
69
Id.
70
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201–02 (1977) (quoting Speiser v. Randall,
357 U.S. 513, 523 (1958)).
63
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Narrowly confining analysis to Patterson, the Court inquired
whether Medina’s allocation of the burden of proof was “rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people.”71 First, the Court recognized
Blackstone’s common-law view that an incompetent defendant should
not be forced to stand trial.72 Next, the Court noted that all fifty states
have enacted procedures to determine if a defendant is competent to
stand trial.73 However, analysis of the procedures used by the fifty states
failed to translate into one uniform position; some states place the burden
on the party raising the issue, some states place the burden on the
defendant to prove incompetence, while still others have held that the
burden rests with the government to demonstrate competency.74
Consequently, because “there is no settled tradition on the proper
allocation of the burden of proof in a proceeding to determine
competence,”75 allocating the burden of proof to the defendant to prove
incompetence does not “offend[] some principle of justice so rooted in
the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental,” as required by Patterson.76 In addition to finding no
constitutional violation for requiring a defendant to prove his own
competence, the Court also found no constitutional violation for a
codified presumption of competence.77
Immediately, Medina cannot be viewed as persuasive Supreme
Court authority to place the burden of proof on the defendant for federal
competency hearings. Detrimentally, Medina strictly involves California
state law, and not the federal statute at issue, 18 U.S.C. § 4241.78
Moreover, in direct contrast to § 4241, the California state law has
explicitly codified a presumption of competence, with an interpretation
that the party claiming incompetence bear the burden of proof.79
Therefore, Medina is unequivocally a demonstration of the
Supreme Court adhering to federalist principles. First, Patterson
illuminates a non-intrusive or deferential approach to state legislatures.80
If a “principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
71

Medina, 505 U.S. at 446.
Id. at 446.
73
Id. at 447.
74
Id. at 447–48.
75
Id. at 446.
76
Medina, 505 U.S. at 446.
77
Id. at 453 (“[T]he challenged presumption is a restatement of the burden of proof,
and it follows from what we have said that the presumption does not violate the Due
Process Clause.”).
78
Id. at 439
79
See supra notes 63–64.
80
Medina, 505 U.S. at 446 (“The analytical approach endorsed in Patterson is thus
far less intrusive than that approved in Matthews.”).
72
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people”81 existed against a defendant testifying to his own incompetence,
the federal circuits would not be split, nor would the fifty states take
various positions on the issue.82 Thus, the analytical approach taken by
the Supreme Court in Medina was not a heightened threshold for the
California law to satisfy. Second, this deferential approach gives reason
to believe that variation in the California law would similarly pass
constitutional muster. For example, if the California law did not codify a
presumption of competence but instead explicitly allocated the burden of
proof to the government, the Supreme Court would again defer to the
state legislature. This conclusion results from two circumstances: first,
the Medina Court conceded that “there is no settled tradition on the
proper allocation of the burden of proof in a proceeding to determine
competence;”83 and second, the Court acknowledged that states have
“considerable expertise in matters of criminal procedure and criminal
process.” 84 As a result, the Supreme Court in Medina was solely
concerned with the constitutional adequacy of California state law, and
the Court’s analysis cannot thereby be imputed to federal competency
standards.85
B. Cooper v. Oklahoma
Approximately four years after Medina,86 the United States
Supreme Court was once more called upon to interpret state law
competency standards in Cooper v. Oklahoma.87 Cooper involved the
defendant’s murdering of an eighty-six-year-old man during a burglary.88
As in Medina, Cooper’s attorney raised the issue of his client’s
incompetency before trial.89 However, Cooper’s incompetency remained
in question throughout the duration of the proceedings, as questions
surrounding his competence were raised on five separate occasions.90
Evidence of defendant’s incompetence included his belief that clothes
81

Id.
See infra Parts IV, V.
83
Medina, 505 U.S. at 446.
84
Id.
85
See id. at 453 (“Rather, our rejection of petitioner’s challenge to § 1369(f) is based
on a determination that California procedure is ‘constitutionally adequate’ to guard
against such results.”).
86
Compare Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437 (1992) with Cooper v. Oklahoma,
517 U.S. 348 (1996).
87
517 U.S. 348, 350 (1996).
88
Id.
89
Id. at 351.
90
Id. at 350 (“On five separate occasions a judge considered whether petitioner
[Cooper] has the ability to understand the charges against him and to assist defense
counsel.”).
82
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selected for him to wear during trial were burning him, an imaginary
spirit was counseling him, and that his defense attorney wanted to kill
him.91 Despite this testimony, the Court repeatedly found that Cooper
was competent to stand trial.92 Expressing his reluctance, the trial judge
stated: “My shirtsleeve opinion of Mr. Cooper is that he’s not normal.
Now, to say he’s not competent is something else.”93
The contradiction between the trial judge’s statement and his
decision to find the defendant competent to stand trial rested with
Oklahoma’s competency statute.
Similar to California’s mental
competency statute, Oklahoma codified a presumption of competence.94
However, a defendant in Oklahoma had the burden of proving his
incompetence95 by the heightened standard of clear and convincing
evidence, not the “more likely than not” standard of the preponderance of
the evidence in California. 96
On appeal, the Court considered “whether a State may proceed with
a criminal trial after the defendant has demonstrated that he is more
likely than not incompetent.”97 The Court noted that, “we are aware of
no decisional law from this country suggesting that any State employed
Oklahoma’s heightened standard until quite recently.”98 Moreover, the
Court noted that only four of the fifty states require a defendant to prove
incompetence by the clear and convincing standard.99 To accentuate that
courts have not embraced the clear and convincing burden of proof when
determining incompetence, the Court looked towards 18 U.S.C. § 4241
and stated: “The situation is no different in federal court. Congress has
directed that the accused in a federal prosecution must prove
incompetence by a preponderance of the evidence.”100
Any subsequent reliance on the Court’s statement in Cooper
regarding the federal burden of proof is misplaced. First, the Supreme
91

Id. at 351–52 n.1.
Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 352 (1996).
93
Id.
94
Compare CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1369(f) (“It shall be presumed that the
defendant is mentally competent. . . .”) with OKLA STAT. tit. 22, § 1175.4(B) (1991)
(“[The defendant] shall be presumed to be competent [to stand trial.]”)
95
OKLA STAT. tit. 22, § 1175.4(B) (1991) (“[The defendant] shall be presumed to be
competent for the purpose of the allocation of the burden of proof and burden of going
forward with the evidence.”) (emphasis added).
96
Compare CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1369(f) (“unless it is proved by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is mentally incompetent.”) with OKLA
STAT. tit. 22, § 1175.4(B) (1991) (“The court, at the hearing on the application, shall
determine, by clear and convincing evidence, if the person is incompetent.”).
97
Cooper, 517 U.S. at 355.
98
Id. at 359.
99
Id. at 360.
100
Id. at 361–62 (emphasis added).
92
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Court’s statement is unconvincing because it is obiter dictum, or that
“said in passing.”“101 Cooper’s appeal to the Supreme Court challenged
the constitutionality of the heightened clear and convincing evidence
standard that Oklahoma codified as necessary to prove incompetency.102
Concluding that the clear and convincing standard violated due
process,103 the Court conducted a survey of what standard of proof
Oklahoma’s sister states had enacted.104 After determining that only four
of the fifty states required clear and convincing evidence,105 the Court
further noted that the federal competency statute only required a
preponderance of the evidence.106 Drawing upon the federal competency
statute served as a corollary to the permissible constitutional standard of
proof—not a discussion of which party should bear that burden. In fact,
unlike Medina, Cooper never established that requiring a defendant to
prove his own incompetence, regardless of the standard of proof, violates
the Due Process Clause. Hence, “this language from Cooper is dict[um]
because the case dealt with state burdens of proof in competency
hearings, not with the federal statutes establishing the standards and
procedures for competency hearings in federal court.”107
Second, although in certain instances Supreme Court dictum can be
authoritative,108 this is not one of those occasions. To determine the
weight given to dictum, the inquiry focuses on the “character of the
dictum.”109 Obiter dictum, which carries light weight, is “[a] judicial
comment made while delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is
unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not precedential.”110
Conversely, if the Supreme Court’s dictum is considered “of recent
vintage and not enfeebled by any subsequent statement,” it can bind
federal circuit courts.111 The Supreme Court’s statement in Cooper must
be categorized as unpersuasive and non-influential obiter dictum. The
District of Arizona appropriately summarized this conclusion by
recognizing that the Supreme Court in Cooper failed to scrutinize or

101

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1177 (9th ed. 2009).
Cooper, 517 U.S. at 350.
103
Id. at 362.
104
Id. at 359.
105
Id. at 360.
106
Id. at 360–62.
107
United States v. Sanchez, 38 F.Supp. 2d 355, 368 (D.N.J. 1999) (emphasis added).
108
Patel, 524 F.Supp.2d at 111.
109
McCoy v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 950 F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 1991) (quoting CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRACTICE § 58 (4th ed. 1983).
110
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1177 (9th ed. 2009).
111
McCoy, 950 F.2d at 19.
102
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evaluate the federal competency statute.112 In short, the Supreme Court’s
assertion that “Congress has directed that the accused in a federal
prosecution must prove his incompetence”113 was incidental to the broad
comparison of Oklahoma’s standard of proof to the remaining forty-nine
states.
Therefore, neither Medina nor Cooper provides an appropriate
foundation for concluding that the federal burden of proof for
competency hearings rests with the defendant. First, the Supreme Court
did not grant certiorari in Medina and Cooper to address the
constitutionality of the federal competency statute, 18 U.S.C. § 4241.114
On the contrary, the only reviewed statutes were state statutes of
California and Oklahoma.115 Moreover, these state statutes are distinct
from 18 U.S.C. § 4241, as both the California and Oklahoma statutes
codified a presumption of competence116 and established the allocation of
the burden of proof to one party.117 Second, the deferential review
exhibited in Medina118 is inappropriate for determining which party bears
the federal burden of proof when there is an absence of delegation.
Finally, Cooper’s one sentence reference to 18 U.S.C. § 4241 served one
narrow purpose: to strengthen the Court’s position that the clear and
convincing evidence standard of proving incompetence is not customary
practice in the American court system.119 Accordingly, the answer to
which party bears the federal burden of proof cannot be found in
Supreme Court precedent.
IV. THE CIRCUITS’ ATTEMPTS TO DETERMINE WHICH PARTY BEARS THE
FEDERAL BURDEN OF PROOF
Due to the lack of statutory placement,120 unsupportive legislative
history,121 and no binding United States Supreme Court decision,122 the
circuits that have addressed the issue are split as to which party bears the
burden of proof.123

112

United States v. Dodds, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13251 at *2 n.1 (D.Az. Mar. 24,

2006).
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123

Cooper, 517 U.S. at 362.
Medina, 505 U.S. at 439.
See Id. at 445; Cooper, 517 U.S. at 362.
See supra note 95.
Medina, 505 U.S. at 440. See supra note 96.
See supra Part III.A.
See supra note 100.
See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part II.B.
See supra Parts III.A, III.B.
Patel, 24 F.Supp. 2d at 112.
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The Third,124 Fifth,125 and Ninth126 Circuits have explicitly placed
the burden of proof on the government to demonstrate the defendant’s
competence. Referencing simple logic, the Third Circuit stated that “it
would be both basically unfair as well as contradictory to say that a
defendant who claims he is incompetent should be presumed to have the
mental capacity to show that he in fact is incompetent.”127 In contrast,
the Fourth128 and Eleventh129 Circuits place the burden of proof on the
defendant to prove his incompetence. Unlike the Third Circuit, neither
the Fourth nor Eleventh Circuits offer any analytical reasoning for their
decisions. Instead, both Circuits merely reference130 Supreme Court
dictum in Cooper v. Oklahoma that “in [a] federal prosecution [the
defendant] must prove incompetence. . . .”131
Besides the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, the
remaining circuits have either not officially considered the burden of
proof issue,132 declined to address the issue, 133 or struggled with an intracircuit split.134

124
United States v. Velasquez, 885 F.2d 1076, 1089 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v.
Hollins, 569 F.2d 199, 205 (3d Cir. 1977); United States v. DiGilio, 538 F.2d 972, 98688 (3d Cir. 1976). Although Hollins and DiGilio are pre-1984, and thus pre-CCCA, for
the purposes of this comment old § 4244 is the functional equivalent of current § 4241 as
the burden of proof was not allocated in old § 4244. See supra Part II.B.
125
Lowenfield v. Phelps, 817 F.2d 285, 294 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Makris,
535 F.2d 899, 906 (5th Cir. 1976). Although Makris is pre-1984, and thus pre-CCCA, for
the purposes of this comment old § 4244 is the functional equivalent of current § 4241 as
the burden of proof was not allocated in old § 4244. See supra Part II.B.
126
United States v. Hoskie, 950 F.2d 1388, 1392 (9th Cir. 1990).
127
Hollins, 569 F.2d at 205.
128
United States v. Robinson, 404 F.3d 850, 856 (4th Cir. 2005).
129
Izquierdo, 448 F.3d at 1278.
130
Robinson, 404 F.3d at 856 (citing Cooper, 517 U.S. at 362); Izquierdo, 448 F.3d at
1277 (citing Cooper, 517 U.S. at 362).
131
Cooper, 517 U.S. at 362.
132
See United States v. Sanchez-Gonzalez, 109 Fed. Appx. 287, 290 (10th Cir. Sept.
9, 2004) (unpublished Tenth Circuit case relying on Cooper to establish that the
defendant bears the burden of proving incompetence); United States v. Siders, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 3780, at *2 (N.D. Iowa Jan. 17, 2008) (unpublished district court case within
the Eight Circuit relying on a Seventh Circuit case to establish that the government bears
the burden of proving competency); Patel, 524 F.Supp.2d at 110 (“[T]he First Circuit
does not appear to have considered the burden of proof issue.”); United States v. Hoyt,
200 F. Supp. 2d 790, 792 (N.D. Ohio 2002) (relying on an unpublished Sixth Circuit
case, United States v. Chapple, 47 F.3d 1170 (6th Cir. 1995) to establish that the
government bears the burden of proving competence); United States v. Rudisill, 43 F.
Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 1999) (relying on Cooper to establish that the defendant bears the
burden of proving incompetence).
133
See United States v. Nichols, 56 F.3d 403, 410 (2d Cir. 1995) (“The federal statute
providing for competency hearings does not allocate the burden of proof, and neither the
Supreme Court nor this Court has decided as a matter of statutory construction whether
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V. THE STATES’ ATTEMPTS TO ALLOCATE THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN
STATE COMPETENCY HEARINGS
The dispute over which party bears the burden of proof in
competency hearings is not limited to the federal circuit courts but is also
prevalent in state legislators and state courts. A current survey of the
states affirms the Court’s recognition in Medina, over seventeen years
ago,135 that there is “no settled tradition” among the states regarding
which party bears the burden of proof in state competency hearings.136
Beginning with states that allocate the burden of proof to the
criminal defendant, Oklahoma is the only state that has codified such
placement.137 The remaining eleven states that force the defendant to
bear the burden of proving his incompetence have done so through
common-law creation.138

the government or defendant bears the burden. We decline, however, to reach this issue
today.”).
134
Compare United States v. Morgano, 39 F.3d 1358, 1373 (7th Cir. 1994) (“The
starting point in all this is the notion that a criminal defendant is presumed to be
competent to stand trial and bears the burden of proving otherwise.”) with United States
v. Teague, 956 F.2d 1427, 1432 n.10 (7th Cir. 1992) (“We note that once the issue of the
defendant’s mental competency is raised, the government bears the burden of proving
that the defendant is competent to stand trial.”).
135
Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 439 (1992).
136
See Id. at 446.
137
OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1175.4(B) (2009).
138
See Lackey v. State, 615 So. 2d 145, 151–52 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992) (“The
defendant bears the initial burden . . .”); Lipscomb v. State, 609 S.W.2d 15, 17 (1980)
(“There is a presumption of competence to stand trial, and the burden of proof of
incompetence is on the defendant.”); Johnson v. State, 433 S.E.2d 717, 719 (Ga. Ct. App.
1993) (“The burden was upon defendant to show incompetency by a preponderance of
the evidence.”); State v. Holmes, 5 So. 3d 42, 55 (La. 2008) (“Thus, the burden is upon
the accused to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the mental incapacity
exists.”); State v. Hansen, 174 N.W.2d 697, 699 (Minn. 1970); Emanuel v. State, 412 So.
2d. 1187, 1888 (Miss. 1982) (“It naturally devolves upon the defendant to go forward
with the evidence to show his probable incapacity to make a rational defense.”); State v.
Chapman, 721 P.2d 392, 395 (N.M. 1986) (“This Court has previously determined that
there is no impropriety in requiring an accused to carry this burden [of proving his
incompetence to stand trial].”); States v. Gates, 309 S.E.2d 498, 502 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983)
(“Defendant has the burden of persuasion with respect to establishing his incapacity.”);
McLaughlin v. State, 575 S.E.2d 841, 843 (S.C. 2003) (“The defendant bears the burden
of proving his incompetence by a preponderance of the evidence.”); State v. Reid, 164
S.W.3d 286, 306–07 (Tenn. 2005) (“The burden of establishing incompetence to stand
trial rests with the defendant.”); Jackson v. State, 857 S.W.3d 678, 680 (Tex. App. 1993)
(“An accused is presumed competent unless she proves her incompetence to stand trial by
a preponderance of the evidence.”).
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Conversely, Illinois,139 South Dakota,140 and Wisconsin141 have
each codified the requirement that the state is required to prove
defendant’s competence to stand trial. Six states, through judicial
decree, share the opinions of Illinois, South Dakota, and Wisconsin.142
Cumulatively, twenty-one states have allocated the burden of proof
through codification or common-law.
Two options remain in those states where the burden of proof has
not been allocated. First, states have elected to place the burden of proof
on the party raising the issue of competency. Nine states143 have reached
this position through statutory creation, while four states144 have reached

139

725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/104-11(c) (LexisNexis 2009) (“[T]he burden of
proving that the defendant is fit by a preponderance of the evidence and the burden of
going forward with the evidence are on the State.”).
140
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-10A-6.1 (2009) (“If the defendant, state, or court
asserts that a defendant is mentally incompetent to proceed, the state has the burden of
proving the mental competence of the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence.”).
141
WISC. STAT. § 971.14(4)(b) (2009) (“If the defendant stands mute or claims to be
incompetent, the defendant shall be found incompetent unless the state proves by the
greater weight of the credible evidence that the defendant is competent.”).
142
See Diaz v. State, 508 A.2d 861, 863 (Del. 1986) (“The prosecution must prove the
defendant’s competence by a preponderance of the evidence.”); Commonwealth v.
Crowley, 471 N.E.2d 353, 357 (Mass. 1984) (“The prosecution bears the burden of proof
of competency once the issue has been raised by the parties or by the judge on his own
motion.”); State v. Zorzy, 622 A.2d 1217, 1219 (N.H. 1993) (“The State has the burden
of proving by a preponderance of evidence that the defendant is competent to stand
trial.”); State v. Lambert, 645 A.2d 1189, 1191 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (“Once a
defendant raises a bona fide doubt as to competency, the burden rests with the State to
establish competency to stand trial by a preponderance of the evidence.”); People v.
Santos, 349 N.Y.S.2d 439, 442 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973) (“[W]hen the issue of mental
competence to stand trial is properly raised the People are only required to establish that
competence by a preponderance of the evidence.”); State v. Heger, 326 N.W.2d 855, 858
(N.D. 1982) (“[T]he prosecution has the burden to establish a defendant’s capacity to
stand trial.”);
143
See ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.100(c) (2009); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-8.5-103(7)
(2009); CONN GEN. STAT. § 54-56d(b) (2008); IOWA CODE § 812.3 (2008); MO. REV.
STAT. § 552.020(8) (2009); 50 PA. STAT. ANN. § 7403(a) (2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.15.3-3(b) (2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-15-5(10) (2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-169.1(E)
(2009).
144
See Medina v. California, 506 U.S. 437, 440 (1992) (California courts have
interpreted their competency statute to force the “party claiming incompetence [to] bear[]
the burden of proving that defendant is incompetent by a preponderance of the
evidence.”); State v. Barnes, 948 P.2d 627, 637 (Kan. 1997) (the Kansas statute
“implicitly contains a . . . burden of proof imposed on the party raising the competency
issue.”); State v. Lott, 779 N.E.2d 1011, 1016 (Ohio 2002) (“Thus, one who challenges
the presumption of sanity or competence must bear the burden of proof to challenge that
presumption.”); Loomer v. State, 768 P.2d 1042, 1045 (Wyo. 1989) (“[T]he burden of
proof by a preponderance of evidence rests on the party seeking to establish that the
accused is competent.”).
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the same conclusion through their courts. Second, the residual states145
have left the determination of competency as a discretionary matter to
the courts.
At best, a survey of the states illustrates a lack of uniformity.
Similar to the inquiry behind the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 4241
and Supreme Court analysis, the approaches taken by the states provides
little guidance in allocating the federal burden proof in competency
hearings.
VI. THE SUBSTANTIVE STANDARDS OF 18 U.S.C. § 4241 REQUIRE
PLACEMENT OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF ON THE GOVERNMENT
Despite the lack of legislative history, non-binding Supreme Court
authority, and debate in the state courts and the federal circuit courts, the
proper allocation of the federal burden of proof is nonetheless
determinable. Pursuant to § 4241, a motion to conduct a mental
competency hearing146 and the ultimate decision to commit the defendant
for treatment147 are predicated on two concerns: the defendant’s inability
to “understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against
him” or inability to “assist properly in his defense.”148 These two factors
in § 4241 demonstrate that Congress was concerned with the defendant’s
ability to furnish his counsel with evidence adducing his mental state, the
risk of error if the defendant was forced to bear the burden of proof, and
the overall fundamental fairness to the adversary system. These three
considerations—access to evidence, risk of error, and fundamental
fairness—collectively demonstrate that the government must bear the
burden of proving competence in federal competency hearings.

145

See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4510 (LexisNexis 2008); HAW. REV. STAT. § 704405 (2009); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-212(1) (2009); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 101-B
(2009); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM PROC. § 3-104 (West 2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS §
330.2020 (2009); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-221 (2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
178.415(4) (LexisNexis 2009); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.370(1) (2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
13, § 4822(a) (2009); W. VA. CODE. ANN. § 27-6A-3(c) (LexisNexis 2009); Flowers v.
State, 353 So. 2d 1259, 1260 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (“The matter is one simply
submitted to the conscience of the trial judge.”); Wallace v. Indiana, 486 N.E.2d 445, 454
(Ind. 1985) (“[T]he only burden which exists rests on the trial judge to satisfy himself
that the accused is or is not competent to stand trial.”); Commonwealth v. Wooten, 269
S.W.3d 857, 863 (Ky. 2008) (“The trial court makes the ultimate determination of
whether a defendant is competent to stand trial.”); State v. Johnson, 4 Neb. App. 776, 787
(Neb. Ct. App. 1996) (“Competency to stand trial is a factual determination and the
means to be employed to determine competency are discretionary with the district
court.”).
146
18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) (2006).
147
Id. § 4241(d)
148
Id. §§ 4241(a); 4241(d).
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A. Access to Evidence
A categorical statement asserting that defense counsel has the
greatest access to evidence to prove his client’s incompetence must be
dismissed. At first glance, this may challenge logic—if the defense
counsel cannot prove the incompetence of its own client,149 how is the
government in a better position to present evidence of the defendant’s
competence? The answer is rooted in the principle that psychiatric
experts and prison personnel, not lawyers, are the most persuasive
individuals in establishing or disproving competency for the trier of
fact.150
A lawyer’s input regarding his client’s mental state is not an
appropriate avenue for the court. First, ethical responsibilities or
attorney-client privilege may serve as preemptive obstacles against an
attorney testifying to his client’s competency.151 Second, even if an
attorney were to testify, his testimony “is far more likely to be
discounted by the fact-finder as self-interested and biased” when
compared to that of a medical specialist.152 Thus, a lawyer’s testimony
serves little probative value,153 as “competency determinations have been
virtually delegated to mental health professionals, whose opinions are
given little scrutiny by the courts. Often, courts are given little or no
additional information for judging the competency of a defendant.”154 In
fact, it has been documented that mental health professional
recommendations have a judicial acceptance rate of ninety percent.155
In a Medina concurrence, Justice O’Connor recognized the
significant role mental health professionals play in the competency
determination but cautioned that “[i]f the burden of proving competence
rests on the government, a defendant will have less incentive to
cooperate in psychiatric investigations, because an inconclusive

149

Medina, 450 U.S. at 450.
Id. at 465-66 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
151
Id.; see also James A. Cohen, The Attorney-Client Privilege, Ethical Rules, and the
Impaired Criminal Defendant, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 529, 556 (1998) (“It is not the
lawyer’s function to impose her view of what is in the client’s best interest. The agency
relationship requires a principal who is competent; the attorney, therefore, is not
authorized to act when she has a reasonable belief that the principal is incompetent.”).
152
Medina, 505 U.S. at 466 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
153
Id. at 455-56 (The “lawyer’s view will likely have no outlet in, or effect on, the
competency determination.”).
154
Cohen, supra note 151, at 544.
155
Medina, 505 U.S. at 465 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also Grant Morris et al.,
Health Law in the Criminal Justice Symposium: Competency to Stand Trial on Trial, 4
HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 193, 199 n.28 (2004) (noting a ninety percent concurrence
rate between judges and mental health evaluators).
150
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examination will benefit the defense, not the prosecution.”156 Justice
O’Connor’s concern is misplaced because prison personnel can
supplement mental health professionals’ recommendations and there is
no federal presumption of competency.
In dissent, Justice Blackmun stressed the importance of prison
personnel testimony when a psychiatric investigation may not be
sufficient.157 In Medina, the criminal defendant was held in jail for a
period exceeding one year prior to his competency hearing.158 During
the time immediately preceding the competency hearing, Medina was
placed in a padded cell for observation.159 As a result, prison personnel
had the opportunity to survey Medina’s behavior in reoccurring fifteenminute intervals.160 Therefore, prison personnel had the opportunity to
neutrally observe a defendant’s behavior before psychiatric examinations
were even conducted. The importance of this surveillance cannot be
minimized; if a defendant exhibits certain behavior with a psychiatrist
but displays the near opposite conduct while incarcerated—whether in
situations like Medina’s or in the standard incarceration setting—prison
personnel can testify to any discrepancies at the competency hearing.
Moreover, concerns regarding improper motives are not sufficiently
compelling when no federal presumption of competency has been
codified. The suggestion that a “defendant will have less incentive to
cooperate”161 when the government bears the burden of establishing
competency makes two assumptions: (1) the defendant is competent, as
the California state law in Medina and Oklahoma state law in Cooper
dictate;162 and (2) the competent defendant mischievously comports his
behavior to portray incompetence solely for the purpose of delaying the
criminal trial. The first assumption is detrimental, as accepting this line
of reasoning would require the federal courts to assume a crucial
precondition not delineated in 18 U.S.C. § 4241. By not recognizing a
presumption of competence, the federal statute thereby places all
defendants, whether truly incompetent or not, on uniform grounds. Thus,
federal concern over deceit is adequately addressed through the trier of
fact’s determination of competency from expert medical and prison
personnel testimony, based on a preponderance of the evidence.

156
157
158
159
160
161
162

Medina, 505 U.S. at 455 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 465 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra note 95.
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B. Risk of Error
The substantive standards of 18 U.S.C. § 4241—the defendant’s
inability to “understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings
against him” or to “assist properly in his defense”163—demonstrate that
Congress was gravely concerned with improperly forcing the defendant
to bear the risk of error. As the defendant’s interest against an erroneous
conclusion outweighs any burden the state may face in postponing the
trial,164 the government must accordingly bear the federal burden of
proving defendant’s competence.
At the conclusion of a mental competency hearing, if the judge
declares a defendant mentally competent to understand the proceedings
against him and assist his attorney in his defense,165 then the trial
proceeds as scheduled. However, if the defendant fails to meet the
threshold requirements of competency, the trial is merely postponed.166
The trial is not postponed indefinitely, but for a “reasonable period of
time, not to exceed four months” in order for the defendant to receive
treatment to regain competence.167 As a result, by placing the risk of
error on the government, the government’s inability to establish
competency will not have prejudicial effects on the government; neither
the merits nor the facts of the case change. Accordingly:
[T]here is comparatively little harm in mistakenly finding a
defendant incompetent, for he will simply be sent to a state
mental health hospital until found sane and then re-tried. In other
words, an erroneous finding of incompetency will do little more
than postpone the trial. Although somewhat burdensome to the
state, this is far less costly than convicting a defendant unable to
assist in or understand his defense.168

In Medina, the Court noted that “the allocation of the burden of
proof to the defendant will affect competency determinations only in a
narrow class of cases where the evidence is in equipoise; that is, where
the evidence that a defendant is competent is just as strong as the
evidence that he is incompetent.”169 Under that scenario, the court’s
163

18 U.S.C. § 4241(a); Id. § 4241(d).
See Cooper, 517 U.S. at 365.
165
18 U.S.C. § 4241(a).
166
Id. § 4241(d).
167
Id. § 4241(d). The reasonable period of time can be extended beyond four months
if the defendant’s condition has not improved, or the government drops the charges
against him. Id. § 4241(d)(2)(A)–(B).
168
Alaya B. Meyes, Supreme Court Review: Rejecting the Clear and Convincing
Evidence Standard for Proof of Incompetence, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1016, 1039
(1996) (emphasis added).
169
Medina, 505 U.S. at 449 (emphasis added).
164
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finding is directly related to the party bearing the burden of proof. For
example, in Medina the defendant bore the burden of proving his
incompetence by a preponderance of the evidence.170 At the conclusion
of the competency hearing, had the evidence been in equipoise, Medina
would have failed to meet his burden of proof. As a result, the trial
would have proceeded, despite the possibility that the defendant may
have been incompetent. In such a “narrow class of cases,”171 the
defendant should not be faulted because the evidence is in equipoise.
Forcing a potentially incompetent defendant to be tried creates a greater
societal harm than the added financial expense of hospitalizing a
competent defendant for “a reasonable period of time.”172 As a result,
cases in equipoise amplify the need for the government to bear the risk of
error.
C. Risk of Error and a Comparison to the Insanity Defense
Prior to the enactment of the CCCA, the federal defense of insanity
was a federal common-law creation.173 Accordingly, “[u]nder federal
common law, the government had the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant was sane at the time of the
offense.”174 This practice reached its pinnacle in 1984 after John
Hinckley, Jr. was acquitted for his plot to assassinate then-President
Ronald Regan, as the government failed to establish Hinckley’s sanity.175
The public was outraged with the acquittal as “[n]ewspapers and
television commentators almost unanimously condemned both the
verdict and the law that permitted it” and “[n]umerous political figures,
including Attorney General Smith and President Reagan, issue[d]
statements” attacking the jury’s finding.176 Thus, Hinckley’s acquittal
served as a catalyst for Congress to drastically reform the insanity
defense through the IDRA.177 The IDRA created a special verdict if the
defense of insanity was raised—”not guilty only by reason of
170

Id. at 440 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1369(f) (West 1982)).
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(1).
173
Rick L. Sorensen, Shannon v. United States: Supreme Court Determines Whether
Federal Courts Should Instruct Juries on the Consequences of a Not Guilty by Reason of
Insanity Verdict, 21. J. CONTEMP. L. 365, 369 (1995).
174
Id. (emphasis added).
175
Shari N. Spitz, Psychiatric and Psychological Examination for Sentencing: An
Analysis of Caselaw form the Second Circuit in Comparison with Other Federal Circuits
and the Governing Federal Statutes, 6 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 133, 137 (2003).
176
Ira Mickenberg, A Pleasant Surprise: The Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict Has Both
Succeeded In Its Own Right and Successfully Preserved the Traditional Role of the
Insanity Defense, 55 U. CIN. REV. 943, 946–47 (1987).
177
Sorensen, supra note 173 at 370.
171
172
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insanity.”178 This verdict could now only be reached if the defendant
proved his insanity through clear and convincing evidence.179
Congressional response to the Hinckley acquittal has two influential
effects on the risk of error analysis for 18 U.S.C. § 4241. First, the
IDRA’s explicit allocation of the burden of proof to defendant when
raising the insanity defense demonstrates that Congress, if warranted,
will explicitly place the burden of proof on the defendant. In direct
contrast, when amending former § 4244 to current § 4241, Congress
could have similarly placed the burden of proof on the defendant but
chose not to do so. As a result, placing the risk of error on the
government to establish the defendant’s competency under 18 U.S.C. §
4241 does not offend Congressional intent. Second, allocating the risk or
error to the government for federal competency hearings is plainly
distinct from the pre-CCCA common law insanity defense. Forcing the
government to establish sanity beyond a reasonable doubt was simply an
“untenable position” for the government to maintain.180 After Hinckley’s
acquittal, “interviews with the jurors . . . suggested that this burden of
proof was a critical factor in their decision to find Hin[c]kley not guilty. .
. . This suggests that if the burden of proof had been on Hin[c]kley, the
jury would have produced a different result.”181 In direct comparison,
allocating the risk of the loss to the government in a federal competency
hearing, based on the less demanding preponderance of the evidence
standard, will not result in an unworkable standard for the government.
Moreover, forcing the government to bear the risk of error on
competency will merely result in the trial’s delay,182 while failure to
satisfy the pre-CCCA standard will terminate the trial.183 Accordingly,
the lower standard of proof and ultimate consequences of failing to meet
that standard act as mitigating factors to opponents of placing the burden
of proof on the government for federal competency hearings.
D. Fundamental Fairness
The Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have explicitly allocated the
burden of proof to the government to establish defendant’s competence,
while the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits have forced the defendant to bear
the burden of proving his incompetence.184 Analysis of these circuits’
178
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181
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decisions conclusively demonstrates that placing the burden of proof on
the government to establish a defendant’s incompetence most accurately
upholds notions of fundamental fairness.
The Third Circuit, one of the three circuits that place the burden of
proof on the Government to establish competence, proffered discussion
of fundamental fairness in its reasoning. Specifically, the Third Circuit
concluded that “[i]t is equally contradictory to argue that a defendant
who may be incompetent should be presumed to possess sufficient
intelligence that he will be able to adduce evidence of his incompetency
which might otherwise be within his grasp.”185 In other words, forcing
the person whose incompetence is in question to prove his incompetence
is “both basically unfair as well as contradictory.”186 The Third Circuit’s
recognition that placing the burden of proof on the defendant to prove his
competence is amplified by the traditional reluctance of the courts “to
require a party to prove negatives.”187
Unfortunately, the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits offer no descriptive
analysis to rebut the Third Circuit. Instead, both the Fourth and Eleventh
Circuits quickly dispose of any analysis or original contemplation by
mechanically deferring to Cooper as their controlling authority.188 The
reference of a non-binding Supreme Court opinion that referred to the
federal incompetency statute in obiter dictum, without more, fails to
illustrate why subsequent adherence to Fourth and Eleventh Circuits
must follow. Based on the Fourth and Eleventh Circuit’s indifference,
the Third Circuit’s logical reasoning is the final consideration to demand
that the government must bear the federal burden of proving a criminal
defendant’s incompetence.
VII. CONCLUSION
If confronted with the 18 U.S.C. § 4241 circuit split, the Supreme
Court will have the opportunity to craft a decision from a clean slate.
Without prior precedent, the Supreme Court is not strictly constrained to
implement a decision that is deferential189 or merely “adequate.”190
Instead, by analyzing the substantive standards of the statute, the Court
can more easily consider the role of access to evidence, risk of error, and
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fundamental fairness.191 These considerations overwhelmingly illustrate
that a criminal defendant cannot be required to demonstrate his own
incompetence, warranting a departure from Cooper’s dictum.192
This approach is consistent with legislative intent. Although one
may wonder how legislative intent can be inferred without a detailed
Senate Report,193 the answer goes beyond the congressional debate
surrounding the CCCA reform. In its place, advocates of criminal
defendants’ rights need not look further than the initial principles
announced by Blackstone, furthered by the passage of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and later reinforced by Chief Justice Burger’s assertion in
Drope v. Missouri.194 With these factors in mind, the question becomes:
how can one argue that a defendant is required to prove his own
incompetence to stand trial when “[t]he legal doctrine against the trial of
an incompetent defendant is firmly rooted in English and American legal
history[?]”195 The answer is: one cannot.
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